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Abstract: We show how to use a decision procedure for WS1S (the MONA tool) to give automated
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size is fixed. Since our mechanized target logic is WS1S, not the finite structures of traditional
model checking, our method employs only two easy reductions outside the decidable framework.
Additionally, we formulate invariants that describe the reachable global states, but the bulk of the
detailed reasoning is left to the decision procedure. Because the notation of WS1S is too low-
level to describe complicated protocols at a reasonable level of abstraction, we use a higher level
language for the protocol description, and then build a tool that automatically translates this language
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Verification of a Sliding Window Protocol Using IOA and MONA
Résumé : Nous montrons comment utiliser une procédure de décision pour WS1S (l’outil MONA)
afin de fournir une preuve automatisée de la correction d’un protocole à fenêtre avec l’hypothèse de
tailles de fenêtre, tampons et canaux non bornées. La vérification est aussi effectuée pour une version
avec fenêtre de taille fixe. Puisque la logique employée est WS1S, par opposition à l’utilisation de
structures finies comme dans le “model-checking” classique, notre méthode utilise deux réductions
simples situées en dehors du cadre décidable. De plus, nous formulons des invariants qui décrivent
les états globaux accessibles, mais l’essentiel du raisonnement détaillé est laissé à la charge de
la procédure de décision. La notation WS1S est de trop bas niveau pour décrire des protocoles
compliqués. Aussi nous utilisons un langage de description de plus haut niveau (IOA) et avons
construit un outil qui le traduit dans la syntaxe de MONA. IOA est dédié à la programmation répartie
et est fondé sur le modèle des “Input/Output Automata”.
Mots-clé : vérification automatissé, methodes formelles, protocole à fenêtre, MONA, I/O Automa-
ta.
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1 Introduction
Network protocols are complicated. Protocol developers often determine the validity of their pro-
tocols by running simulations. While simulations can be useful, simulations generally cannot show
that a protocol is correct for all possible cases. Mechanical formal verification is another way to
check the validity of protocols. The traditional benchmark used for testing mechanical verifica-
tion of protocols is the alternating bit protocol [2]. For this protocol, many papers have shown that
mechanical verification is viable (see for example [22, 5, 18, 11, 17, 1]).
In this article we demonstrate that an abstract algorithm description language can be effectively
linked to the MONA tool [15, 12] for verification purposes. In particular, with only a couple of
simple abstraction steps, the verification of invariants can be fully automated for network protocols
that are substantially more complicated than the alternating bit protocol. We also argue that the state
machine description IOA language [8] allows us to express the protocol at a convincing level of
abstraction, and we discuss a translator from IOA to MONA.
We use these tools to verify a sliding window protocol. The protocol allows a dynamic and
unbounded window size; and it assumes unbounded, lossy channels, and unbounded buffers. Our
automated tools also allow us to verify the protocol with a fixed window size, and we verify the
protocol with a window size as large as 256. The proof depends on two simple, meta-logical sim-
plifications in the spirit of abstract interpretation. The proof itself consists of an invariant whose
correctness is established automatically by MONA.
The main contribution of our work is to effectively demonstrate that the MONA tool can be used
to verify non-trivial protocols with unbounded data structures as well as bounded data structures.
Unbounded data structures cannot be handled by traditional Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [4]
based tools. On the other hand, theorem provers (for example [10, 19, 7]) can also handle unbounded
data structures. However, given the complexity of the protocol we verify in this work, we believe
our verification process requires a lot less user interaction than is typical with theorem provers. By
linking the MONA tool with IOA via the translation tool, we also allow users to describe protocols
in a reasonably intuitive manner.
1.1 The MONA Tool
The MONA tool is an efficient implementation of the decision procedures for WS1S (Weak Second-
order Logic of One Successor) and WS2S (Weak Second-order Logic of Two Successor). WS1S is a
variation of first-order logic with quantifiers and boolean connectives. Its interpretation is tied to a
somewhat weakened version of arithmetic. The WS1S first order variables denote natural numbers,
which can be compared and subjected to addition by constants. The logic also allows second-order
variables which can be interpreted as a finite set of numbers. WS2S is a generalization of WS1S
interpreted over the infinite binary tree.
A MONA program consists of a number of declarations and formulas. While the WS1S/WS2S
logics have a simple and natural notation, the notation is too low-level to define protocols in a read-
able manner. Thus, we decided to use a high level language for describing the protocols. The
protocol written in the high level language would then be translated to an equivalent MONA pro-
gram.
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1.2 The IOA Language
We decided to use the IOA language of Garland and Lynch [8] as the high level language. The
IOA language is a precise language for describing Input/Output (I/O) Automata and stating their
properties. I/O Automata [16], models components in asynchronous concurrent systems as labeled
transitions systems. The model provides a mathematical framework for describing and reasoning
about system components that interact with each other in an asynchronous manner. An I/O automa-
ton consists of five components, a set of states, a nonempty set of start states, a set of actions, a set
of steps, and a optional set of tasks. The set of actions can be partitioned into three disjoint sets,
input, output, and internal. The set of tasks is a partition of the output and internal actions of the
automaton.
1.3 Related Work
The sliding window or go back n protocol is used in various standard data link control (DLC) pro-
tocols such as HDLC (high level DCL) and SDLC (synchronous DCL). It also forms the basis of
reliable transport layer protocols like TCP. The sliding window protocol has been studied exten-
sively and there are several works that present manual verification of the protocol. For example
see [23, 13].
There has been a lot less work on mechanical verification of the sliding window protocol. An
early example of this work is by Brand and Joyner [3]. This work is similar to the work presented
here in that only safety properties are verified. Their verification method is based on symbolic
execution. Another way in which this work is similar to ours is that the verification is based on
proving a number of invariants. However, the verification of the invariants is not fully automatic. In
order to prove them, the system in [3] generates over a thousand theorems. Of these theorems only
about 80% are proven automatically. The other 20% are proven by hand.
In [21] Richier et al. use temporal logic and model checking to verify safety properties of the
sliding window protocol. Because of the state explosion problem, verification is only possible for
a fairly restricted set of values of parameters. Another paper in which a mechanical verification of
the sliding window protocol is carried out is [14] by Kaivola. In this paper both safety and liveness
proofs are performed. In order to alleviate the state explosion problem, Kaivola uses composition-
al property preserving equivalences and preorders which allows one to replace components of a
system with smaller ones. The verification can then be carried out on the smaller systems. Using
non-divergent failures divergences (NDFD) preorders, safety and liveness properties of the sliding
window protocol for arbitrary channel lengths and “realistic” parameter values are verified semi-
automatically. The largest parameter value presented in Kaivola’s paper is a window size of seven,
which is used with two other smaller fixed values that represent buffer sizes. Godefroid and Long [9]
verify a full duplex sliding window protocol with the queue size as large as 11. Queue BDDs which
they introduce and use in their verification of the protocol are very similar to BDD-represented au-
tomata used by the MONA tool.
One way in which our work here differs from the other papers on mechanical verification of
the sliding window protocol is that our model of the protocol is different from the others. First, we
assume that the sender and receiver have unbounded buffers and that the sender uses an unbounded
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set of sequence numbers. Because we assume unbounded sequence numbers, we do not require
that the channels in our model be FIFO. While the assumption of unbounded buffers and sequence
numbers is not a realistic one, in the situation where the sliding window protocol is used in the
transport layer of the Internet (a la TCP [20]), the assumption of FIFO channels is not realistic either.
TCP does not assume FIFO channels, instead it uses timeout mechanisms to simulate unbounded
sequence numbers. This timeout mechanism is quite complicated, so we decide to just assume
unbounded sequence numbers. Nevertheless, we believe our model more closely resembles the
actual workings of TCP that the models used in the related work discussed above. Another way in
which our work differs is that we do not have to assume a fixed window size. Our model allows the
window size to be set nondeterministically. However, if we assume a fixed window size, we have
verified the protocol with a window size of 256.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we briefly describe the program that translates IOA to the MONA syntax. Section 3
and 4 contain descriptions of two versions of the sliding window protocol with unbounded window
sizes, and also describes the abstractions we use. The proof of safety is discussed in Section 5. In
Section 6 we discuss the case where we fix the window size, and we also present some experimental
results. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. Finally, we have two appendices with the IOA
code for the various models of the protocol we present.
2 The Translator Program
The IOA language is Turing complete. Therefore, we cannot translate every IOA program into
a valid equivalent WS1S/WS2S formula. However, we are able to translate a subset of the IOA
language that is sufficiently expressive to allow the formulation of reasonable protocol descriptions.
We treat the simple built in types of the IOA language in a straightforward manner. IOA types
boolean and (non-negative) integer translate to boolean and integer in WS1S. However, we cannot
translate reals, and we do not translate IOA types character or string.
The IOA language also has several built in “compound” types. These types are, Array[I,
E], Map[I, E], Seq[E], Set[E] and Mset[E]. For these types, I is the index type, and
E is the type of the elements. Each compound type has a set of built in operators. We are able to
translate these compound types when the size of E has a known bound. However, for type Set[E],
where E is the set of integers, we translate directly to the MONA representation of sets of integers.
The other types we represent in MONA as a group of sets where one set contains the valid indices,
when the data type has indices, and the other set(s) are used to represent the elements. The IOA
language also has an enumeration type. We represent this type in MONA using boolean valued
variables, where the bit value of the variables taken together as binary number corresponds to the
enumerated values.
We illustrate the translation schema with a small example. If we have an IOA type Animals
which is an enumeration of dog, cat, rat, and bat, it is translated to MONA boolean (zero’th-
order) variables, say S0 and S1, where the values S0 = false and S1 = false represent dog,
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S0 = false and S1 = true represent cat, S0 = true and S1 = false represent rat,
and S0 = true and S1 = true represent bat. A compound IOA variable animalBuf that
has type Seq[Animals] is translated into three second order MONA variables, say S2, S3, and
S4. The first set S2 holds the set of valid indices for the sequence. The other two sets encode the
values in these positions in the following manner: for each valid index in S2 the presence or absence
of that index in sets S3 and S4 encodes the values in the position. Thus, if dog is the value of
position 0 in the sequence, then sets S3 and S4 do not contain the value 0. However, if cat is
the value in position 0, then set S3 does not contain 0 while set S4 does. Thus, animalBuf =
[cat, rat, dog, bat, rat] where cat is at index position 0 is represented by the MONA
sets S2 =  	
	 , S3 =  	 , and S4 =  	
 . IOA operators on sequences are translated
accordingly. We give two examples here, head and tail. The MONA translation of the head
operator checks if the value 0 is present in the first set representing the sequence, This is a test for
emptiness, and if the sequence is empty head is undefined. If the sequence is not empty, the two
boolean values returned by the MONA operations 0 in S3 and 0 in S4 gives the value of the
head of the sequence. In this example the values returned would be false and true, which is our
MONA representation for cat. Obtaining the value at each indexed position  in the sequence is
translated in the same manner by replacing 0 with  . To get the tail of a sequence, the maximum
valued element is removed from the first set in the representation. This gives the new set of indices.
For our example, the MONA syntax is S2   S2  . To update the values in the other sets we
first remove the element 0 from each of these sets and then subtract 1 from each remaining element.
The MONA syntax for these operations are: S3  
ﬁﬀﬂ and S4  
ﬁﬀﬂ . Thus, for our example
after a tail operation, S2 =  	
	
 , S3 =  	ﬃ , and S4 =  
 .
IOA transitions are translated to MONA predicates. We used unprimed and primed MONA
variables to represent the pre and post states of the IOA variables. IOA transitions are atomic,
but the assignments in a transition happen sequentially. Thus, in our MONA translation we add
temporary variables to hold intermediate values. The translator also generates a MONA predicate
that represents the assignment of initial values to the IOA variables.
To facilitate the verification process we add a predicate, preds, section to the IOA language
constructs. The preds section of an IOA program contains named predicates on the state of the
program variables. We translate the predicates to unprimed and primed MONA predicates of the
same name. The unprimed state represents the values before a transition and the primed states
represent the values after the transition. Two MONA predicates Inv and Inv  that respectively
are the conjunction of the unprimed and primed predicates in the preds section are automatically
generated. Inv is the Invariant we wish to verify holds for the IOA protocol. The translator also
creates a separate file for each transition in the IOA program. Each file contains a MONA predicate
of the form Inv  step ! Inv  , where step is the name of the IOA transition. Additionally, a
MONA file which contains the MONA formula to test that Inv holds in the initial state is generated.
These are the necessary files for the MONA tool to automatically verify the invariant. To verify that
the invariant holds, we run MONA on each of the files. If MONA tells us that all the formulas are
valid, then the invariant holds.
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ChannelRS(p)
ChannelSR(p)
Sendersend(d)
rcvpktRS(i)
deliver(d)Receiver
rcvpktSR(i)
sendpktRS(i)
sendpktSR(d)
Figure 1: The basic structure and components of a sliding window protocol.
3 Sliding Window Protocol Description
In this section we describe our general IOA model of a sliding window protocol. The sliding window
protocol is a mechanism for reliable message delivery in a distributed setting where a sender and a
receiver communicate over lossy channels. Any message delivery protocol has the same basic four
components, a sender, a receiver, a channel from the sender to the receiver, and a channel from the
receiver to the sender. The basic structure of these protocols is shown in Figure 1. In addition to the
four components we model, there are two external users. The user on the sender side inputs the data
to be sent by the sender, and the user on the receiver side gets the data that the receiver delivers.
The basic idea of the sliding protocol is that a window of size     determines how many
successive packets of data can be sent in the absence of a new acknowledgment. The window size
may be fixed or may vary depending on the conditions of the different components of the protocol.
In our model we will assume that   varies nondeterministically. Each packet of data is sequentially
numbered, so the sender is not allowed to send packet   before packet  has been acknowledged.
Thus, if  is the sequence number of the packet most recently acknowledged by the receiver, there
is a window of data numbered   to   which the sender can transmit. As successively
higher-numbered acknowledgments are received, the window slides forward. The acknowledgment
mechanism is cumulative in that if the receiver acknowledges packet  , where     , it means
it has successfully received all packets up to  . Packet  is acknowledged by sending a request
for packet 	  . Typically, transmitted data is kept on a retransmission buffer until it has been
acknowledged. Thus, when  is acknowledged, packets with sequence number less than or equal
to  are removed from the retransmission buffer. Packets that are not acknowledged are eventually
retransmitted. For our modeling of the sliding window protocol we assume that sequence numbers
are unbounded, we do not assume that the channels are FIFO.
Below we present two IOA versions of the sliding window protocol. The first version is a general
formulation, where the data domain is unspecified. The second version of the protocol is a parame-
terized transition system expressible in WS1S; it relies on two additional assumptions: that the data
domain consists of two values and that the channels are approximated (in the sense to be explained).
RR n˚3959
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3.1 A General Sliding Window Protocol Model
In this section we define a sliding window protocol as an I/O Automaton. The I/O automaton is
defined using the IOA language. The general IOA model is shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 in Ap-
pendix A.
3.1.1 Types
The type D represents a data domain whose internal structure is unspecified. The type A is an
acknowledgment type, and has only one possible value, ack.
3.1.2 Signature and States
The signature is a partition of the actions of the automaton into input, output and internal actions.
The actions send(d), sendpktSR(d), prepareNewSeg(d), prepareRetranSeg(d)
and rcvpktRS(i) all happen on the sender side. The actions rcvpktSR(i),
sendpktRS(i), and deliver(d) happen on the receiver side, and the actions dropSR(i)
and dropRS(i) happen in the channel from the sender to the receiver and the channel from the
receiver to the sender respectively. We explain the functionality of each action when we describe the
transitions below.
The states part of the IOA program represents the set of states and the set of initial values. In the
listing, variables SendBuf through hRetranBuf are variables of the sender, variables RcvBuf
through temp are receiver variables, variable transitSR is the state variable of the channel from
the sender to the receiver, and variable transitRS is the state variable of the channel from the
receiver to the sender. The variable SendBuf is a sequence that holds elements of type D and is
initially empty. This buffer holds the input data as it is received from the external user. The position
of the element in the sequence corresponds to the sequence number of that piece of data. The buffer
has an associated pointer called hSendBuf; the section from hSendBuf to len(SendBuf) is
called the unsent part of SendBuf, which is empty to begin with as denoted by the initial value of
hSendBuf.
The variables RetranBuf and hRetranBuf represent the retransmission buffer in the same
way the send buffer is represented. The variable W represents the current edge of the window, that
is, the highest index allocated for use by the retransmission buffer. The current size of the sliding
window is W - hRetranBuf + 1. Variable readyToSend is a boolean flag. It is set whenever
a datum in the segment variable is ready to be transmitted; seqNum is then the sequence number
of that segment.
On the receiver side, the variable RcvBuf holds received data before it is passed to the external
user. Variable hRcvBuf is the index of the first element of the undelivered part of this buffer. The
variable sendAck is a boolean flag that enables the sending of an acknowledgment packet, and
temp is a data variable that is used to hold a value received from the channel before it is added to
RcvBuf.
The variables transitSR and transitRS are map types that represent packets in transit
from the sender to the receiver and from the receiver to the sender respectively. Both maps are
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indexed by integers. The transitSR map holds elements that are multisets with elements of type
D. These elements are multisets because there may be duplicates of data packets on the channel.
The index of the defined elements in transitSR represents the sequence number of the packet(s).
For transitRS the element type is a multiset of type A. The index of an element of transitRS
represents the acknowledgment number of the packet.
3.1.3 Transitions
The send(d) input causes the data item d from the external user to be appended to the end of
SendBuf. The internal action prepareNewSeg(d) prepares the data item d to be sent. This
is data that has not been sent before. The precondition for this action requires readyToSend =
false, which means the sending of no other data is currently enabled. The condition texttthSend-
Buf   len(SendBuf) means the active part of the send buffer, SendBuf, is not empty. The
data item d is the element index by hSendBuf. There must also be space available in the allowable
window. If hSendBuf  W then there is space in the window. W is initially set non-deterministically
to a value greater than zero, and it is non-deterministically updated when acknowledgments are re-
ceived. The effect of the prepareNewSeg(d) action is to append d to the retransmission buffer,
RetranBuf. The sending of this data item in a packet is also enabled by assigning seqNum to
hSendBuf, setting readyToSend to true, and assigning segment to d. hSendBuf is also
incremented so that it is the sequence number of the next new packet to be sent.
The internal action sendpktSR(d) sends the data item d if readyToSend is true and d =
segment. This action assigns readyToSend to false so that no more data is sent until some
preparation occurs. An element is placed on the channel by inserting it into the multiset in the
position in the transitSR map indexed by seqNum.
The internal action rcvpktRS(i) passes an acknowledgment packet from the receiver to the
sender. The position of the element in the transitRSmap represents the acknowledgment number.
When the packet is received it is deleted from the multiset. An acknowledgment is only valid if it
is not an old acknowledgment (hRetranBuf  i). If the acknowledgment packet is valid, then
hRetranBuf is assigned to i, which effectively removes the acknowledged packets from the active
part of RetranBuf. When packets are acknowledged, there is more room in the available window
for new packets. Therefore, for valid acknowledgments we also non-deterministically update the
value of W, the edge of the window. This new value of W must of course be no less than the previous
value, and it must also be no less than the head of the retransmission buffer.
The prepareRetranSeg(d) action prepares the data item at the head of the retransmission
buffer for retransmission. The preconditions and effects of this action are similar to those of the
prepareNewSeg(d) action except that the data item comes from RetranBuf and not Send-
Buf.
The rcvpktSR(i) action happens on the receiver side. This action passes a data item to the
receiver. The element in the transitSRmap must be defined, and it must be a non-empty multiset.
If a packet is received, then the receiver must send an acknowledgment; that is why the sendAck
flag is set to true. In our model the receiver only accepts the next piece of data it is expecting, so it
adds data to RcvBuf if its sequence number is the next one expected by the receiver. That is, if i
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= len(RcvBuf) + 1. The variable temp is used to hold a data value from the multiset that is
extracted non-deterministically. That data value is then appended to the receive buffer.
The output action deliver(d) passes the data item at the head of RcvBuf to the external
user. There is an item to be passed only if hRcvB is less than or equal to len(RcvBuf). Naturally,
hRcvB is incremented after the data is passed.
The sendpktRS(i) action sends an acknowledgment packet. The acknowledgment number
i is len(RcvBuf) + 1. The variables sendAck and transitSR are updated accordingly.
The actions dropSR(i) and dropRS(i) are internal actions of the channel from the sender
to the receiver and the channel from the receiver to the sender respectively. These actions drop a
copy of a packet from the respective channels by removing elements from the respective multisets at
index position i.
4 A WS1S Sliding Window Model
We desire to prove that what comes out is what goes in; that is, for all reachable states:
Predicate omega
For all  if    len(RcvBuf) then SendBuf[i] = rcvBuf[i].
We establish this safety property by exhibiting an invariant that implies omega. However, we
are not able to carry out any automated proof of invariance for the general model. Instead, we will
bend the general model into an abstract model whose transitions can be represented in WS1S. The
abstract model is shown in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Appendix B.
4.1 First simplifying assumption
The general model is parameterized with the D type. Our first simplifying assumption is based on
idea of data-independence:
Proposition 1 [24] The omega property holds for all reachable states of all abstract programs if
and only if it holds for D =   white, red  .
Proof: The program itself contains no comparisons of data. Thus, if there is some D and some reach-
able state that violates the omega property by virtue of SendBuf[i]   and rcvBuf[i]   
with     , then the same program on the same domain D but with all send (  ) actions replaced
by send(  ), where 	
 if           and, arbitrarily, 	
  if           , will result in a
reachable state violating the omega property. Thus, a two-value data domain suffices to establish
omega for all domains. (This proof is due to Wolper [24].)
The concrete model is the general model, where D    white  red  .
4.2 Second Simplifying Assumption
Our second simplifying assumption is that the channel structure of the concrete model can be sim-
plified so that each sequence number is associated not with a multiset, but with an element in a fixed,
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finite set. The method is that of abstract interpretation [6], where the computation is modeled in an
abstract domain, which approximates the concrete domain.
4.2.1 The Abstract Domain
The abstract domain multiD models a multiset over D by four different values: D_empty rep-
resents the empty multiset; D_r represents a multiset that contains only red occurrences; D_w
represents a multiset that contain only white occurrences; and D_rw represents a multiset that
have occurrences of both red or white. This correspondence can be expressed mathematically
by an abstraction function  	
 : Mset    red, white  MultiD that maps a multiset to an
abstract value. Similarly, the correspondence can be expressed by a concretization function 	
 :
MultiD  Set

Mset

  red, white  that maps an abstract value to the set of corresponding
multisets. Note that if  is not D_empty, then  	
 ﬀ is an infinite set of multisets.
Also for any multiset ﬁ , ﬁ   	
ﬃﬂ   	
 ﬁ  . In this sense, the abstract domain approxi-
mates the concrete values of the multisets. The approximation is not exact, of course, since generally
there will be many other multisets in  	
!ﬂ   	
" ﬁ  than ﬁ .
The multisets of the transitRS channel are modeled by the domain multiA whose values
are A_empty, denoting the empty multiset, and A_pres, denoting a non-empty multiset.
In the second IOA model, we call a global state  an abstract state. It contains two maps modeling
the channels, and each may contain an unbounded number of abstract values denoting multisets.
The concretization functions above define for an abstract state  a set    of states # of the
concrete IOA model.
All operations involving the multisets are then modified to work on the abstract values. For
example, the dropping of a message as specified in dropSR(i), where i is a sequence number,
involves the deletion of an element v from the multiset transitSR(i). In the WS1S version, the
deletion is modeled by changing the multiD value non-deterministically. For example, D_rw is
changed to either D_r (there is only one occurrence of a white message, which is dropped), D_w
(there are only white occurrences after dropping the single red message), or D_rw (there are still
occurrences of both red and white messages after a message has been dropped).
This treatment of the abstractions entails that for any computation in the concrete model #%$&#(')*)) ,
we can find a corresponding computation in the abstract domain $&'*))) , whose states include
those of the concrete computation in the sense that #*+    ﬀ+ . In particular, if #,$ is the initial state
of the concrete model, then we can let $ be the initial state of the abstract model.
Proposition 2 Let - be a formula that does not refer to channels. If - holds for all reachable states
of the abstract model, then - holds for all reachable states of the concrete model.
Proof:
1. We omit the details which establish on a transition by transition basis that the abstract opera-
tions are such that any concrete computation corresponds to an abstract one.
2. By the restriction on - , all variables - mentions have the same value in # as in .  # . Therefore,
- holds about # if and only if it holds about .  #* .
The statement of the proposition is implied by 1. and 2.
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4.3 The Abstract Model
The abstract model (Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8) is obtained from a transformation of the concrete model.
The preds section are predicates on the state of the automaton. We prove in Section 5, where
these predicates are discussed further, that their conjunction is an invariant of the IOA Sliding-
Window.
5 Proof of Safety
We use the standard inductive meta-argument for proving safety properties through invariants. We
find a formula -  that implies the safety property, and we show that -  holds for the initial state, and
that for every step  &     if -  holds in state  then it also holds in state   . All such proofs are
completely automated.
Our main task at hand is to find -   .
5.1 The Predicates
Predicate omega asserts the safety property. It corresponds to predicate omega in the IOA and
MONA descriptions of the sliding window protocol. The IOA version of the predicate is shown
in Figure 8. By itself this predicate is not invariant, so a stronger condition is needed. The other
predicates are found by a combination of intuition and interaction with the MONA tool. When the
MONA tool is run on a predicate that is not an invariant, the counter example provided by MONA
gives some indication of what is needed to strengthen the predicate. Typically, the counter example
involves some state that intuition tells one is not reachable from any start state. A predicate is
then written to verify this intuition. The verification of this new predicate may in turn lead to the
formulation of other predicates. Below we list the other predicates we need and give some intuition
as to why they are needed.
Predicate alpha asserts basic properties about the length of the various buffers in the automaton
SlidingWindow. This predicate corresponds to predicates alpha1 through alpha6 in the IOA
and MONA versions of the sliding window protocol. The IOA verison is shown in Figure 8.
Predicate alpha
1. hSendBuf   (len(SendBuf) + 1).
2. hSendBuf  seqNum.
3. hSendBuf = len(RetranBuf) + 1.
4. hRetranBuf ﬂ (readyToSend   seqNum ﬂ .
5. For all  if define(transitSR, i) then (hSendBuf    .
6. hSendBuf  len(RcvBuf)  len(SendBuf)  len(RcvBuf).
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Predicate beta, shown below, corresponds to predicate beta in Figure 8. It states that the re-
transmission buffer is a prefix of the send buffer.
Predicate beta
For all  if    len(RetranBuf) then SendBuf[i] = RetranBuf[i].
Predicate gamma, shown below, corresponds to predicate gamma in Figure 8. It states that when
a segment with a given sequence number is to be placed on the channel, the value of the element in
the sequence number position in the send buffer is the same as the value of the segment.
Predicate gamma
For all d if segment = d  readyToSend then SendBuf[seqNum] = d.
Predicate delta corresponds to predicates delta1 and delta2 in Figure 8. It states that for all
reachable states of the protocol, if there is an abstraction for a data type in particular position in the
transitSR map, then that actual element is in the same position in SendBuf.
Predicate delta
1. For all  if transitSR[i] = D_r then SendBuf[i] = red.
2. For all  if transitSR[i] = D_w then SendBuf[i] = white.
Shown below is Predicate epsilon. It corresponds to predicates epsilon1 and epsilon2 in
Figure 8. It asserts that if there is an element of a particular value at an index  in the retransmission
buffer and that index is also defined in transitSR, then either the abstract representation of the
element in transitSR corresponds to the value of the element at index  in the retransmission
buffer, or the abstract representation of the element in transitSR corresponds to the element
being absent.
Predicate epsilon
1. For all  if defined(transitSR, i)  RetranBuf[i] = red then
transitSR[i] = D_r   transitSR[i] = D_empty.
2. For all  if defined(transitSR, i)  RetranBuf[i] = white then
transitSR[i] = D_w   transitSR[i] = D_empty.
The final predicate is Predicate zeta. It corresponds to predicates zeta1, zeta2, and zeta3
in Figure 8. Parts one and two assert that if there is a packet with the current sequence number
in transit, and the current segment has a particular color value, then the afore mentioned packet in
transit never has a value that corresponds to a different color from the color of the current segment.
The third part says that in our model of the protocol there is never a packet in transit from the sender
to the receiver that has a value that corresponds to it having both the values red and white.
Predicate zeta
1. If defined(transitSR, seqNum)  segment = red then transitSR[seqNum]

 D_w.
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2. If defined(transitSR, seqNum)  segment = white then transitSR[seqNum]

 D_r.
3. For all  if defined(transitSR, i) then transitSR[i]  D_rw.
We claim the conjunction of all the predicates above is invariant for SlidingWindow. The
claim is proved by using MONA to automatically verify the following:
 
 

	
 

 


 
	
 
	 ﬀ
 ﬁ

)
This invariant clearly implies the safety property. The verification of the protocol with unbounded
window sizes took 68.26 seconds. The largest number of states generated by the MONA tool during
the process was 18886, and the largest number of BDD nodes was 277859. We ran the tools on a
SUNW,Ultra-5_10.
6 Fixed Window Size
In this section we discuss our results for the protocol where the window size is fixed. Figure 9
in Appendix B shows the two changes we make in the protocol to use a fixed window size. For
the prepareNewSed(d) transition the test to check if there is available space in the allowable
window is changed to hSendBuf   (hRetranBuf + 256), where 256 is the fixed window
size. For the rcvpktRS(i) transition, the change is removing the update of the variable W.
Table 1 lists our experimental results. In the table, the states and BDD nodes columns holds the
largest number of states and the largest number of BDD nodes generated by the MONA tool during
the verification respectively. The results show that the processing time, the largest number of states,
and the maximum number of BDD nodes generated by the MONA tool grows linearly as a function
of the window size. The linear growth is to be expected: the amount of information that flows
across positions  to    in the unbounded queues is bounded, since it is encoded in a finite-state
automaton. The automaton in the bounded case must, in addition, count up to the window size, and
that makes the resulting automaton size linear in the window size. In our experiments we note that
the size of the automaton and the running time in the bounded case surpasses that of the unbounded
case for window sizes greater than 44.
window size time (sec’s) states BDD nodes
16 30.98 4838 147223
32 46.67 5983 258583
64 86.63 11103 481303
128 342.01 21343 926743
256 1286.45 41823 1817623
Table 1: The results of our experiments verifying the protocol with different fixed window sizes.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have demonstrated that a decision procedure for WS1S can be used to verify safety
properties of a non-trivial network protocol.
Although our work indicates that for network protocols a good deal of nitty-gritty reasoning
about queues and indices can be carried out automatically, more research into the following problems
is needed:
  handling of sequence numbers that wrap around modulo the length of the window,
  handling of a more concrete presentation of queues, such as those actually found in a real
programming language,
  automated support for abstraction steps,
  handling of liveness properties.
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A The General IOA Model
type D % data types
type A   enumeration of ack
automaton SlidingWindow(D: type)
signature
input send(d: D)
internal sendpktSR(d: D), prepareNewSeg(d: D), prepareRetranSeg(d: D),
rcvpktRS(i: Int), rcvpktSR(i: Int), sendpktRS(i: Int),
dropSR(i: Int), dropRS(i: Int)
output deliver(d: D)
states
SendBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hSendBuf: Int :   1,
W: Int :   choose n where (n  0),
RetranBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hRetranBuf: Int :   1,
readyToSend: Bool :   false,
segment: D,
seqNum: Int :   0,
RcvBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hRcvB: Int :   1,
sendAck: Bool :   false,
temp: D,
transitSR: Map[Int, Mset[D]] :   empty,
transitRS: Map[Int, Mset[A]] :   empty
Figure 2: Type definitions, the signature, and set of states of the general model of the protocol.
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transitions
input send(d)
eff SendBuf :   SendBuf   d
internal prepareNewSeg(d)
pre readyToSend   false  hSendBuf  len(SendBuf)  d   SendBuf[hSendBuf]
 len(RetranBuf)  W
eff RetranBuf :   RetranBuf   d;
seqNum :   hSendBuf;
hSendBuf :   hSendBuf + 1;
readyToSend :   true;
segment :   d
internal sendpktSR(d)
pre readyToSend   true  d   segment
eff readyToSend :   false;
transitSR :   update(transitSR, seqNum, insert(d, transitSR[seqNum]))
internal rcvpktRS(i)
pre defined(transitRS, i)  transitRS[i]   {}
eff transitRS :   update(transitRS, i, delete(ack, transitRS[i]));
if hRetranBuf  i then
hRetranBuf :   i;
W :   choose n where (n  W  n  hRetranBuf)
fi
internal prepareRetranSeg(d)
pre readyToSend   false  d   RetranBuf[hRetranBuf]
 hRetranBuf  len(RetranBuf)
eff readyToSend :   true;
seqNum :   hRetranBuf;
segment :   d
internal rcvpktSR(i)
pre defined(transitSR, i)  transitSR[i]   {}
eff sendAck :   true;
if i   len(RcvBuf) + 1 then
temp :   choose v where (v  transitSR[i]);
RcvBuf :   RcvBuf   temp;
transitSR :   update(transitSR, i, delete(temp, transitSR[i]))
fi
Figure 3: Transitions for the general IOA model of the protocol.
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output deliver(d)
pre hRcvB  len(RcvBuf)  d   RcvBuf[hRcvB]
eff hRcvB :   hRcvB + 1
internal sendpktRS(i)
pre sendAck   true  i   len(RcvBuf) + 1
eff sendAck :   false;
transitRS :   update(transitRS, i, insert(ack, transitRS[i]))
internal dropSR(i)
pre defined(transitSR, i)  transitSR[i]   {}
eff temp :   choose v where (v  transitSR[i]);
transitSR :   update(transitSR, i, delete(temp, transitSR[i]))
internal dropRS(i)
pre transitRS[i]   {}
eff transitRS :   update(transitRS, i, delete(ack, transitRS[i]))
Figure 4: The final group of transitions for the general IOA model of the protocol.
B The WS1S IOA Model
type D   enumeration of red, white % data types
type MultiD   enumeration of D_empty, D_r, D_w, D_rw % data packet types
type MultiA   enumeration of A_pres, A_empty % ack packets types
automaton SlidingWindow
signature
input send(d: D)
internal sendpktSR(p: D), prepareNewSeg(d: D), prepareRetranSeg(d: D),
rcvpktRS(i: Int), rcvpktSR(i: Int), sendpktRS(i: Int),
dropSR(i: Int), dropRS(i: Int)
output deliver(d: D)
Figure 5: Type definitions and the signature of the WS1S IOA model of the protocol.
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states
SendBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hSendBuf: Int :   1,
W: Int :   choose n where (n  0),
readyToSend: Bool :   false,
seqNum: Int :   0,
segment: D,
RetranBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hRetranBuf: Int :   1,
RcvBuf: Seq[D] :   {},
hRcvBuf: Int :   1,
sendAck: Bool :   false,
transitSR: Map[Int, MultiD] :   empty,
transitRS: Map[Int, MultiA] :   empty
transitions
input send(d)
eff SendBuf :   SendBuf   d
internal prepareNewSeg(d)
pre readyToSend   false  hSendBuf  len(SendBuf)  d   SendBuf[hSendBuf]
 len(RetranBuf)  W
eff RetranBuf :   RetranBuf   d;
seqNum :   hSendBuf;
hSendBuf :   hSendBuf + 1;
readyToSend :   true;
segment :   d
internal prepareRetranSeg(d)
pre readyToSend   false  d   RetranBuf[hRetranBuf]
 hRetranBuf  len(RetranBuf)
eff readyToSend :   true;
seqNum :   hRetranBuf;
segment :   d
internal rcvpktRS(i)
pre defined(transitRS, i)  transitRS[i]   A_pres
eff if hRetranBuf  i then
hRetranBuf :   i;
W :   choose n where (n  W  n  hRetranBuf)
fi;
transitRS :   choose v
where (v   update(transitRS, i, A_empty))   (v   transitRS)
Figure 6: The set of states and transitions of the WS1S IOA model of the protocol.
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internal sendpktSR(d)
pre readyToSend   true  d   segment
eff readyToSend :   false;
if d   red then
if (   defined(transitSR, seqNum)   (transitSR[seqNum]   D_empty)
  transitSR[seqNum]   D_r) then
transitSR :   update(transitSR, seqNum, D_r)
elseif transitSR[seqNum]   D_w then
transitSR :   update(transitSR, seqNum, D_rw) fi
elseif d   white then
if (   defined(transitSR, seqNum)   (transitSR[seqNum]   D_empty)
  transitSR[seqNum]   D_w) then
transitSR :   update(transitSR, seqNum, D_w)
elseif transitSR[seqNum]   D_r then
transitSR :   update(transitSR, seqNum, D_rw) fi
fi
internal rcvpktSR(i)
pre defined(transitSR, i)  transitSR[i]   D_empty
eff sendAck :   true;
if i   len(RcvBuf) + 1 then
if transitSR[i]   D_r then
RcvBuf :   RcvBuf   red;
transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_empty))   (v   transitSR)
elseif transitSR[i]   D_w then
RcvBuf :   RcvBuf   white;
transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_empty))   (v   transitSR)
elseif transitSR[i]   D_rw then
RcvBuf :   choose b
where (b   RcvBuf   red)   (b   RcvBuf   white);
if last(RcvBuf)   red then
transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_w))   (v   transitSR)
else transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_r))   (v   transitSR) fi
fi
fi
Figure 7: More transitions of the WS1S IOA model of the protocol.
RR n˚3959
22 Smith and Klarlund
output deliver(d)
pre hRcvBuf  len(RcvBuf)  d   RcvBuf[hRcvBuf]
eff hRcvBuf :   hRcvBuf + 1
internal sendpktRS(i)
pre sendAck   true  i   len(RcvBuf) + 1
eff sendAck :   false;
transitRS :   update(transitRS, i, A_pres)
internal dropSR(i)
pre defined(transitSR, i)  transitSR[i]   D_empty
eff if transitSR[i]   D_r   transitSR[i]   D_w then
transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_empty))   (v   transitSR)
else transitSR :   choose v
where (v   update(transitSR, i, D_r))  
(v   update(transitSR, i, D_w))   (v   transitSR)
fi
internal dropRS(i)
pre defined(transitRS, i)  transitRS[i]   A_pres
eff transitRS :   choose v
where (v   update(transitRS, i, A_empty))   (v   transitRS)
preds
alpha1 hSendBuf  (len(SendBuf) + 1);
alpha2 hSendBuf  seqNum;
alpha3 hSendBuf   len(RetranBuf) + 1;
alpha4 (hRetranBuf  0)  (readyToSend   seqNum  0);
alpha5  i: Int (defined(transitSR,i)   (hSendBuf  i ));
alpha6 hSendBuf  len(RcvBuf)  len(SendBuf)  len(RcvBuf);
beta  i: Int ((i  len(RetranBuf))   (SendBuf[i]   RetranBuf[i]));
gamma  d: D ((segment   d  readyToSend)   SendBuf[seqNum]   d);
delta1  i: Int ((transitSR[i]   D_r)   SendBuf[i]   red);
delta2  i: Int ((transitSR[i]   D_w)   SendBuf[i]   white);
epsilon1  i: Int ((defined(transitSR, i)  (RetranBuf[i]   red))  
(transitSR[i]   D_r   transitSR[i]   D_empty));
epsilon2  i: Int ((defined(transitSR, i)  (RetranBuf[i]   white))  
(transitSR[i]   D_w   transitSR[i]   D_empty));
zeta1 (defined(transitSR, seqNum)  segment   red)  
transitSR[seqNum]   D_w;
zeta2 (defined(transitSR, seqNum)  segment   white)  
transitSR[seqNum]   D_r;
zeta3  i: Int (defined(transitSR, i)   transitSR[i]   D_rw);
omega  i: Int (i  len(RcvBuf)   (SendBuf[i]   RcvBuf[i]))
Figure 8: The final set of transitions, and a series of predicates the conjunction of which is invariant on the
reachable states of the protocol.
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internal prepareNewSeg(d)
pre readyToSend   false  hSendBuf  len(SendBuf)  d   SendBuf[hSendBuf]
 hSendBuf  (hRetranBuf + 256)
eff RetranBuf :   RetranBuf   d;
seqNum :   hSendBuf;
hSendBuf :   hSendBuf + 1;
readyToSend :   true;
segment :   d
internal rcvpktRS(i)
pre defined(transitRS, i)  transitRS[i]   A_pres
eff if hRetranBuf  i then hRetranBuf :   i fi;
transitRS :   choose v
where (v   update(transitRS, i, A_empty))   (v   transitRS)
Figure 9: The transitions of the protocol with a fixed window size that are different from the transitions in the
protocol with unbounded and dynamic window sizes.
RR n˚3959
Unité de recherche INRIA Lorraine, Technopôle de Nancy-Brabois, Campus scientifique,
615 rue du Jardin Botanique, BP 101, 54600 VILLERS LÈS NANCY
Unité de recherche INRIA Rennes, Irisa, Campus universitaire de Beaulieu, 35042 RENNES Cedex
Unité de recherche INRIA Rhône-Alpes, 655, avenue de l’Europe, 38330 MONTBONNOT ST MARTIN
Unité de recherche INRIA Rocquencourt, Domaine de Voluceau, Rocquencourt, BP 105, 78153 LE CHESNAY Cedex
Unité de recherche INRIA Sophia-Antipolis, 2004 route des Lucioles, BP 93, 06902 SOPHIA-ANTIPOLIS Cedex
Éditeur
INRIA, Domaine de Voluceau, Rocquencourt, BP 105, 78153 LE CHESNAY Cedex (France)
http://www.inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
